Summary. A generalization of flow games, namely, flow games with committee control is considered, to obtain a representation of non-negative balanced games. The committee control is modeled with the aid of simple games. Linear production games with committee control are also studied and results on the balancedness of such games are obtained.
Introduction
Kalai and Zemel [5] introduced flow games and proved that every flow game is totally balanced and every nonnegative totally balanced game is a flow game. Our main aim in this paper is to derive a similar result for the larger class of balanced games and a generalization of flow games, namely, flow games with committee control. We will also look at a generalization involving committee control of the linear production game introduced by Owen [7] . In Sect. 2 we will give the necessary definitions and notations. In Sect. 3 the main result concerning balanced games and flow games with committee control is proved. Section 4 is dedicated to linear production games with committee control and to some remarks on related work.
Flow Games with Committee Control
In this section we will introduce and define the concepts that we will need throughout the paper.
A cooperative game in characteristic function form
is an ordered pair (N, v) where N= (1, 2, ...,n} is a finite set, the set of players and v is the characteristic function which assigns to every subset of N a real number with the restriction that v assigns 0 to the empty subset. When there can be no ambiguity about the set of players we identify (N, v) with the characteristic function v. Elements of 2 N, that is, the set of subsets of N, are called coalitions and for every coalition S the number v(S) is regarded as the worth of S, i.e. that which the members of S can achieve if they work together. The question which arises is how to It is a well known fact that a simple game has a nonempty core iff the set of veto players of the game is non-empty. Let iN, v) be a simple game with set of veto players V :/: 0. Then
Flow games are defined as follows. Let G be a directed network with set of vertices P and set of arcs L. For every p E P let B(p) denote the set of arcs which start in p and E(p) the set of arcs which end in p. Every arc l E L has a certain capacity c(/)>~ 0 and belongs to a player i E N. We distinguish two different vertices from the others, a source and a sink. For each S E 2 N let G s be the network obtained from G by keeping all the vertices but removing all arcs which are not owned by a member of S. The new set of arcs is denoted by L s. Note that GN = G and LN = L. A flow from source to sink in such a network is a function f from L s to with 0 ~<f(/) ~< c(/) for each l E L s and such that for every vertex p except the source and the sink Such a subset of Ls is called a cut of the network G S. Note that a cut of G can be made into a cut of Gs by removing from it all arcs which are not owned by a member of S. The capacity of a cut is the sum of the capacities of the arcs that it contains. A well-known theorem of Ford and Fulkerson [3] states that the value of a maximum flow in a network is equal to the capacity of a minimum cut, i.e., a cut with minimum capacity. Kalai and Zemel [5] use this theorem to prove that a flow game is totally balanced.
Here we want to combine the notions of flow games and simple games to define flow games with committee control. In these games the arcs are not owned by the players but are controlled by committees consisting of subsets of players. This committee control is modeled with the aid of simple games. To every arc lEL a simple game w t is assigned. A coalition S is said to control l iff wt(S ) = 1. The network G s is obtained from G by keeping all the vertices and removing all arcs which are not controlled by S. Again L s denotes the resulting set of arcs and G N = G, LN = L. Again v(S) is defined to be the value of a maximum flow in G s. The following example shows that a flow game with committee control can have an empty core.
Example. Let N = {1, 2}, P = (source, sink), L consists of one arc directed from the source to the sink with c(l) = 10, wt(S) = 1 for every S E 2N\{o). Then v(S) = 10 source 9 ) 9 sink
The value of such a flow is
In the flow game corresponding to this network v(S) is defined to be the value of a maximum flow from source to sink in G s. Let A be a subset of P such that the source is an element of A and the sink is not. By Flow games with ownership can be seen as flow games with committee control as well. The simple game which describes the control of an arc is then defined to be the game with the owner as dictator. For every i EN we denote the game with i as dictator by 8 i. Hence, 6i(S ) = 1 iff i E S.
It follows from Kalai and Zemel [5] that flow games with committee control, where all the simple games describing the control of the arcs, have dictators, are totally balanced. In the next section we will see that these are not the only flow games with committee control which are balanced.
Balanced Games
In this section we will give a representation of nonnegative balanced games as flow games with committee control. First we will show that a flow game with corn-
